Russia’s War Machine: How It Fights Without Winning (Q2 2025)

As negotiations flicker in the background of a grinding war, the endurance of Russia’s war effort remains a decisive — yet often misunderstood — factor. This is not a war Russia is winning. But neither is it collapsing. It is grinding forward, powered by foreign lifelines, decades-old tanks, exhausted manpower, and an industrial base struggling under pressure. This article explores how Russia’s military machine continues to function, what sustains it, and why that fragility matters now — especially as diplomacy reawakens.

Key Insights

• Russian militarily operations increasingly depend on Iranian drones, North Korean shells, and Chinese dual-use tech.
• Soviet-era tanks and low-morale penal units form the backbone of current offensives.
• Equipment flow to Syria and Africa has thinned, revealing domestic prioritization.
• Without external disruption, Russia could sustain its current pace another 6–9 months — at high human cost.
  

I. Lifelines: Who Keeps Russia Supplied?

Russia’s military machine is still moving — but not alone. Beneath the image of domestic resilience lies a growing dependence on foreign supply chains that allow the Kremlin to sustain its campaign without exhausting its industrial base. These lifelines are unofficial, deniable, and in many cases, illegal. But they are also essential.

Three foreign states form the backbone of Russia’s external supply chain: North Korea, Iran, and China. Each provides different materials, each operates with plausible deniability, and each fills a gap that Russia cannot close on its own.

• North Korea has emerged as a top supplier of artillery ammunition, delivering an estimated 1 million+ 122mm and 152mm shells since late 2023. These deliveries, largely moved by rail via the Khasan–Tumangang crossing, are now assessed to account for between 70–100% of Russian artillery usage on the Ukrainian front^24. This dependency grew as Russia’s own stockpiles thinned and domestic production failed to scale beyond 2–3 million shells annually.
• Iran continues to ship Shahed-136 drone kits, which are assembled in facilities near Yelabuga, in Tatarstan. These drones are used for both surveillance and kamikaze-style strikes, often targeting Ukraine’s power grid and transport hubs. OSINT from Janes and ISW confirms that the Caspian Sea remains the primary maritime route for these shipments^29.
• China, though less overt, provides a steady flow of dual-use components — including optics, bearings, and machine tools — through overland trade hubs like Manzhouli. These components feed into Russia’s degraded tank and drone production lines, filling gaps left by the collapse of Western electronics imports^42.

None of these actors admit to supplying weapons. But customs data, satellite imagery, and shipping analysis confirm that Russia’s war effort would not be viable without them.

II. Industry at Full Strain

Russia’s domestic arms industry has proven more adaptive than many expected. But that adaptability hides a deeper truth: the system is no longer scaling — it is stretching.

The signs are everywhere. From Soviet-era tanks pulled out of storage to factory floors working double shifts to meet bare-minimum quotas, the Russian defense-industrial complex is in a race against its own obsolescence. Production continues, but expansion is limited by capacity, workforce constraints, and foreign component shortages.

• Tank retrofits are the clearest example. In Q2 2025, multiple OSINT threads confirm the deployment of T-55 and T-62 tanks on the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk fronts^27. These platforms, last produced in the 1970s and 80s, are being restored in Uralvagonzavod and other regional plants. Analysts estimate Russia can refurbish 80–100 tanks per month — just enough to compensate for frontline losses, but not enough to shift battlefield momentum.
• New production lines remain hamstrung by electronics and optics shortages, many of which were previously imported from Western or East Asian sources. While Chinese components have partly filled the gap, they are not always compatible or timely, leading to bottlenecks in UAV and IFV assembly^42.
• Export de-prioritization marks another constraint. Russia has significantly reduced arms deliveries to Syria, Mali, and the Central African Republic, rerouting those resources back to the Ukrainian front^43. Maritime tracking to Tartus shows fewer shipments than at any point since 2019, and Wagner-linked forces in Africa report delays in restocking.

Russian state media points to an industrial revival. In reality, production is real — but not limitless.

• Factories like Uralvagonzavod and Almaz-Antey are operating full-time.
• Yet they face key constraints:
• Lack of skilled labor (due to mobilization)
• Shortage of high-precision electronics
• Aging or sanctioned equipment

Much of Russia’s current output involves refurbishing Soviet stocks, not producing modern systems.

In total, Russia’s defense base is surviving — but barely. It cannot expand output to match Western aid flows to Ukraine. Instead, it is forced to cannibalize, consolidate, and rely increasingly on allies whose own industries are limited.

This is not a sustainable war economy. It is a defensive posture disguised as persistence.

III. Manpower: Disposable Battalions and Political Calculations

If weapons are Russia’s external lifeline, manpower is its internal gamble.

While the Kremlin avoids a second nationwide mobilization, it continues to feed the front through a system of invisible conscription and expendable formations. The burden is no longer equally shared. Instead, it is absorbed by the country’s farthest regions — and by those considered expendable.

The clearest indicator of this strategy is the escalating use of penal units. Often composed of convicts granted early release in exchange for service, these formations are now a standard element of Russian assault operations. In the Avdiivka and Robotyne sectors, UK MOD and independent OSINT sources confirm that penal battalions suffered 50–60% casualty rates in Q2 2025 alone[^35][^48]. These soldiers are typically sent into exposed positions with minimal artillery or armor support.

Parallel to this, Russia has increased the deployment of conscripts from Far Eastern territories such as Khabarovsk Krai and Buryatia. These troops are often far from media attention, face less public scrutiny, and — according to Meduza and Gulagu.net reports — are transferred in low-visibility waves by train or air[^31].

The training pipeline has also been compressed. Intercepts verified by Ukrainian military intelligence suggest that many soldiers now receive 30–45 days of basic training — in some cases, as little as three weeks — before being rotated into combat units[^44].

• Penal battalions: used for high-risk assaults; heavy losses
• Far East conscripts: less political resistance; quietly mobilized
• Accelerated training: lower readiness; faster rotation

IV. ISR and Surveillance Weakness

Precision warfare depends not only on firepower, but on eyes — and in 2025, Russia’s ability to see the battlefield is increasingly compromised.

At the heart of its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effort are imported technologies. Iranian Shahed drones, assembled in Tatarstan, and Chinese optical systems embedded in UAVs and artillery guidance kits form the backbone of this capability. But that backbone is brittle.

According to Janes and the Institute for the Study of War, Russia’s ISR effectiveness is directly tied to the continuity of these imports. Any disruption in Iranian drone kits or Chinese sensor exports could trigger a 30–60 day collapse in targeting precision[^50]. While Russia touts its domestic innovation, OSINT and intercepted technical complaints point to ongoing integration problems and replacement delays when foreign systems fail or arrive incomplete.

• Shahed drones enable deep-strike targeting and grid saturation
• Chinese optics power artillery spotting, reconnaissance drones, and fire correction systems
• ISR decay is visible in recent strike misses and failed cruise missile raids[^29][^42][^50]

These aren’t just battlefield issues — they’re strategic ones. Without effective ISR, Russian missile strikes become area bombardments. Artillery becomes wasteful. And the cost of every engagement rises.

Update – Strategic Bombers Hit Inside Russia

In late May and early June 2025, Ukraine executed a series of deep strikes on Russian airbases housing long-range bombers, reportedly damaging or destroying Tu-22M3 and Tu-95 aircraft at multiple sites. These attacks, confirmed by satellite imagery and open-source verification, pierced Russia’s supposed rear-area security and exposed critical ISR failures. Despite Russia’s investment in layered defenses and imported surveillance gear, Ukraine demonstrated the ability to identify, target, and hit high-value strategic assets well beyond the front. The strikes are a reminder that surveillance degradation is not an abstract weakness — it translates into real vulnerability, even at the heart of Russia’s strategic deterrence infrastructure.

V. Strategic Outlook: Sustainability Without Victory

Russia’s war machine is not about victory. Not anymore.

Endurance

By Q2 2025, it has become an exercise in endurance — a military posture calibrated not to advance decisively, but to remain intact long enough to shape political outcomes. The goal is to convince the world that Russia cannot be defeated, and therefore, must be negotiated with.

Our analysis of the Signals suggests that Russia can sustain its current operational tempo for another 6–9 months, assuming no major supply disruption. That estimate rests on the continuity of three conditions:

1. Unbroken foreign supply chains from North Korea, Iran, and China
2. Continued industrial improvisation, including tank retrofits and dual-use imports
3. Human reserves — political tolerance for losses in penal units and distant provinces

If any of these breaks, the war effort will contract rapidly. If all three hold, Russia may still not win — but it will not collapse either.

This is the paradox of Russia’s war in 2025: it is both precarious and persistent. It lacks the strength to overrun Ukraine, but enough scaffolding to remain a threat. Its exports have thinned, its industry is strained, and its soldiers are often undertrained and overexposed — but the system holds.

Strategic Leverage: Where Sanctions Could Bite

With foreign supply lines propping up Russia’s war machine, the effectiveness of targeted sanctions deserves renewed attention. Four pressure points stand out:

• Iran: Apply pressure on maritime routes in the Caspian corridor — especially via inspections, regional partnerships, or diplomatic exposure.
• China: Escalate scrutiny on dual-use exports through secondary sanctions targeting firms or logistics intermediaries.
• North Korea: Monitor and disrupt logistics through the Khasan–Tumangang rail corridor and North Korean shipping nodes.
• Africa: Freeze Wagner Group and Rosoboronexport’s remaining operations in Mali, CAR, and other strategic outposts.

A full breakdown is provided in the accompanying Sanctions Brief.

Predicted Effects

(based on prior sanctions modeling and disruption patterns)

Sanction	Short-term effect	Long-term risk
Iran UAV logistics	ISR degradation within 30–60 days	Escalation in Middle East (retaliation via proxies)
Chinese optics crackdown	Reduced drone guidance & armor production	PRC backlash; export rerouting via SE Asia
NK shell interdiction	Shell shortage within 3 months	Increased black market workarounds
Syria/Africa disruption	Marginal strategic gain	Minimal effect on Ukraine warfront

Decision Support Summary

• Highest Impact: Iranian UAV maritime disruption
• Most Achievable: NK logistics interdiction via rail/maritime monitoring
• Highest Risk: Sanctioning Chinese state-linked tech firms
• Strategic Combo: 1 + 3 (UAVs + shells) yields maximum frontline degradation without immediate global escalation

Forecast Summary:

• Russia’s endurance is real, but conditional
• Human losses are the hidden cost of this stability
• Western leverage lies not in speed, but in disruption

In the coming months, policymakers will ask whether Russia is ready for peace. This report offers a different lens: Russia may not want peace — but it needs fewer failures to keep fighting.

References

Signals

Sources